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PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-2192 
______________ 
 
JANET BATCHELOR, 
individually and on behalf of her 
son; R.B., A Minor, 
                           Appellants 
v. 
 
ROSE TREE MEDIA SCHOOL 
DISTRICT; THE BOARD OF 
SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF THE 
ROSE TREE MEDIA SCHOOL 
DISTRICT; LINDA 
BLUEBELLO, Director of Pupil 
Services of Rose Tree Media 
School District; ERIC BUCCI, 
Assistant Principal of Penncrest 
High School;  NORMAN 
HARRISON, Assistant Principal 
of Penncrest High School; 
RICHARD GREGG, Principal of 
Penncrest High School; KAREN 
WALKER; PATRICIA BARTA 
______________ 
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES  
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA  
(Case No. 2-11-cv-06733) 
District Judge: Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II 
______________ 
 
Argued: January 14, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
Frank Schwartz, Esq., ARGUED 
Lamm Rubenstone 
3600 Horizon Boulevard 
Suite 150 
Trevose, PA 19053 
 Counsel for Appellants  
 
Craig D. Ginsburg, Esq., ARGUED  
Michael I. Levin, Esq. 
Levin Legal Group 
1800 Byberry Road 
1301 Masons Mill Business Park 
Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006 
 Counsel for Appellees 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Janet Batchelor (“Ms. Batchelor”), individually and on 
behalf of her son, Ryan Batchelor (“Ryan”) (collectively 
“Appellants”) filed suit against the Rose Tree Media School 
District (“District”), and six individual District employees1 
(“Individual Appellees”) (collectively “Appellees”)2, 
asserting their entitlement to the statutory protections of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
794(a) (“Section 504”), and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.  The District Court 
dismissed Appellants’ federal claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 
Appellants intentionally failed to exhaust the administrative 
remedies under the IDEA.  This appeal followed.   
                                                 
1
 Individual Appellees include: (1) Linda Bluebello, the 
District’s Director of Pupil Services; (2) Richard Gregg, the 
Principal of Penncrest High School; (3) Eric Bucci, an 
Assistant Principal of Penncrest High School; (4) Ralph 
Harrison, an Assistant Principal of Penncrest High School; (5) 
Patricia Barta, the Director of Special Education for the 
District; and (6) Karen Walker, a special education teacher at 
Penncrest High School.  (Second Amended Complaint 
(“Complaint” or “Compl.” ¶¶ 6-11) (Mar. 5, 2012.))  
2
 Appellants’ Complaint originally included the District’s 
Board of School Directors as a Defendant, but Appellants 
voluntarily withdrew them.  
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 On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court 
erred in concluding that their federal claims are subject to the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.  Alternatively, they argue 
that their claims are exempt from exhaustion.  For the reasons 
provided below, we determine that Appellants’ federal claims 
indeed fall within the ambit of the IDEA and require 
exhaustion, and further, that no exception to the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement applies under the facts presented.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Appellants’ federal claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grant of 
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it is appropriate to draw the 
facts from the allegations contained in the Complaint, and to 
accept them as true.  See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning 
Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
1. Ryan’s Freshman (2008-2009) and Sophomore Years 
(2009-2010) 
 
 In December 2008, during his freshman year at 
Penncrest High School, Ryan was diagnosed with Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, which is designated as a 
disability within the meaning of Section 504.  (Compl. ¶ 20.)  
The District developed and implemented a written 504 Plan 
(“504 Plan”) for Ryan, pursuant to which the District placed 
Ryan in an achievement center for support and provided Ryan 
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with counseling and tutoring.
3
  These services continued 
throughout Ryan’s freshman year; however, in October 2009, 
Ms. Batchelor learned that Ryan’s guidance counselor had 
failed to schedule Ryan for placement in the achievement 
center for his sophomore year.  More important, Ryan’s 
teachers did not receive a copy of his 504 Plan.  (Id. at ¶¶ 22-
25.)  Despite Ryan’s subsequent assignment to the 
achievement center, in December 2009 and again in March 
2010, Ryan’s guidance counselor reported to Ms. Batchelor 
that Ryan was failing his classes.  (Id. at ¶ 27.)   
 
 On March 15, 2010, Ms. Batchelor met with Vice 
Principal Harrison to discuss Ryan’s struggles, and informed 
him that the District was not providing Ryan with the support 
services required by the 504 Plan.  (Id. at ¶ 28.)  Appellants 
allege that Mr. Harrison was hostile and offensive during the 
meeting, and, at its conclusion, Ms. Batchelor informed Mr. 
Harrison she would be contacting an attorney.  (Id.)   
 
 The next month, in April 2010, Ms. Batchelor and her 
attorney met with District representatives to discuss the 
District’s failure to implement Ryan’s 504 Plan.  (Id. at ¶ 36.)  
After this meeting, the District assigned Ryan to a resource 
room, provided tutoring, and, in an effort to better identify the 
nature of Ryan’s learning disability, administered additional 
testing and evaluations.  (Id. at ¶ 37.)  Following testing, 
which evidenced that Ryan had an additional math disability, 
an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) meeting was held 
                                                 
3
 The parties did not provide the Court with a copy of Ryan’s 
504 Plan.   
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with the District and Ms. Batchelor, and subsequently, the 
District developed an IEP for Ryan.
4
 (Id. at ¶ 38.)   
 
 As a result of the April 2010 meeting, the District 
offered Appellants a settlement whereby Ms. Batchelor would 
waive all claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA, 
and the District would provide compensatory education 
services to Ryan.  (Id. at ¶ 39.)  Specifically, the settlement 
agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) required the District 
to “establish a[] fund for compensatory education consisting 
of one hundred sixty hours of tutoring . . . .”  Defs.’ Mem. of 
Law in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for a TRO and Imposition of a 
Prelim. Inj. Ex. 3, Ryan Batchelor, et al. v. Rose Tree Media 
School District, et al., Case No. 2:11-cv-06733-CDJ (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 9, 2011), ECF No. 6-3.  The Settlement Agreement 
became effective at the beginning of Ryan’s junior year, on 
September 24, 2010.  (Compl. ¶¶ 39-40.) 
 
2. Ryan’s Junior Year (2010-2011) 
 
 The District failed to reimburse Ms. Batchelor for the 
costs of private tutoring incurred between January and April 
                                                 
4
 The parties also did not provide the Court with a copy of 
Ryan’s IEP.  We relay the limited information concerning its 
contents provided in the Complaint.  We presume that Ryan 
became IEP eligible upon being diagnosed with a math 
disability because Section 504 defines disability more broadly 
than the IDEA, and thus, some students covered by Section 
504 are not covered under the IDEA.  Compare 20 U.S.C. § 
1401(3) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (incorporated by reference 
in 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B)).    
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2011, despite its obligations to do so under the Settlement 
Agreement.  Consequently, Ms. Batchelor filed a breach of 
contract action, which resulted in the District partially 
reimbursing her for the tutoring costs.  Nevertheless, the 
District refused to reimburse Ms. Batchelor for the cost of 
tutoring services incurred thereafter.  (Id. at ¶ 62.) 
 
 Appellants allege that, in addition to failing to 
implement the Settlement Agreement, during Ryan’s junior 
year the District engaged in retaliatory acts against them.  (Id. 
at ¶¶ 42-50).  For example, Appellants allege that, in an act of 
retaliation, the District changed Ryan’s math tutor from a 
teacher he had worked well with to a tutor who was sarcastic, 
impatient, and mean, causing Ryan to “feel badly about 
himself.”  (Id. at ¶ 43.)  In another example of retaliation, 
Appellants allege that the District assigned Ryan to a teacher 
whom they knew Ryan considered to be a bully.  Indeed, on 
Ryan’s first day of class, he was wrongly disciplined and 
humiliated.  (Id. at ¶ 57.)  
 
3. Ryan’s Senior Year (2011-2012) 
 
 Due to the District’s failure to implement the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement and Ryan’s IEP, as well as the 
continuing acts of bullying and retaliation Ryan and Ms. 
Batchelor suffered, Ryan withdrew from Penncrest for his 
senior year and enrolled in Twenty First Century Cyber 
Charter School.  (Id. at ¶ 66.)  In another act of alleged 
retaliation, the District refused to allow Ryan to participate in 
Penncrest’s choir and dance teams during his senior year even 
though he remained a District resident.  (Id. at ¶ 67.) 
8 
 
  Appellants allege that, collectively, the District’s 
retaliatory actions were severely detrimental to Ryan’s 
educational achievement and health.   
B. Procedural History 
 On October 27, 2011, Appellants filed the Initial 
Complaint, and on March 5, 2012, filed the Complaint at 
issue here.  In the Complaint, Appellants make three federal 
claims: (1) retaliation/failure to provide a free appropriate 
public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the IDEA, 20 
U.S.C. § 1401(9) (Count II, Appellants v. District); (2) 
retaliation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Count III, Appellants v. District); 
and (3) retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 
(Count IV, Appellants v. District & Individual Appellees).
5
  
Appellants seek compensatory damages, statutory damages, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and  “such other further relief as 
this court deems just and appropriate.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 82, 92, 
101.)   
 Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which Judge 
Sitarski granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, on the ground that Appellants 
                                                 
5
Appellants initially included claims for discrimination as part 
of Counts II, III, and IV, but those claims were voluntarily 
dismissed.  (App. 138a.)  Additionally, the Complaint 
contained three state law claims (Counts I, V, and VI), but 
Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski dismissed those claims by 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  (Pls.’ Opp’n 
Mot. Dismiss at 2; App. 138a.)  The dismissal of these state 
law claims is not before us on appeal.  
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failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the 
IDEA.  See Magistrate Judge Sitarski’s Report & 
Recommendation, Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media School Dist., 
11-cv-6733, 2012 WL 7990542, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2012) 
(hereinafter R&R).  Judge C. Darnell Jones, II of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
adopted Judge Sitarski’s Report and Recommendation.  
 On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court 
erred in concluding that their claims are subject to the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement.  (Appellants’ Br. 10.)  Alternatively, 
Appellants argue that their claims are exempt from the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because: (1) they seek only 
monetary damages, which are unavailable under the IDEA 
(id. at 13-15); (2) the implementation exception applies (id. at 
15-19); and/or (3) the futility exception applies.  (Id. at 19-
20.)   
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Appellants’ 
IDEA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over an appeal from a dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188.  Because Appellees 
made a facial challenge to the District Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), that is, they contested the 
sufficiency of the pleadings, “we review only whether the 
allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege 
10 
 
facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
6
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The IDEA Statutory Scheme 
 The purpose of the IDEA is to “ensure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 
public education that emphasizes special education and 
related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . .”  20 
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).  Under the IDEA, a state is eligible 
for federal funding if it complies with several requirements, 
all aimed at protecting the rights of students with disabilities 
and their parents.  The main requirement is that states make 
available a FAPE to children with disabilities.  Id. § 
1412(a)(1).
7
  States must comply with detailed procedures for 
                                                 
6
 Judge Sitarski determined, and the parties do not disagree, 
that Appellees made a facial attack on subject matter 
jurisdiction.  (R&R at *3.)  
7
 The state administers a FAPE by developing an IEP for 
every child with disabilities.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); see also 
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1982).  Although the IDEA does not 
set forth definite guidelines for the formulation of an IEP, 
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, at a minimum, “[t]he IEP must be 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s 
intellectual potential.”  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. 
P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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identifying, evaluating, and making placements for students 
with disabilities, as well as procedures for developing IEPs.  
They must also implement specified procedural safeguards to 
ensure children with disabilities and their parents are 
provided with due process.  These safeguards, known 
collectively as the IDEA’s administrative process, provide 
parents with an avenue to file a complaint and to participate 
in an impartial due process hearing with respect to “any 
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the[ir] child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child . . . .”  Id. § 
1415(b)(6)(A); see also id. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (parents who have 
filed a complaint “shall have an opportunity for an impartial 
due process hearing . . . .” ).  The IDEA’s administrative 
process is conducted in compliance with state procedures.  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
8
   
 
 Following completion of the IDEA’s administrative 
process, i.e., exhaustion, the IDEA affords “[a]ny party 
aggrieved by the findings and decisions” made during or 
pursuant to the impartial due process hearing an opportunity 
for judicial review.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); Komninos v. 
Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                             
 Note that the Rowley decision refers to the Education 
of the Handicapped Act.  458 U.S. at 188.  Congress changed 
the name of the statute to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”) in 1990. See Pub.L. No. 101-476, 
104 Stat. 1141 (1990).  To avoid confusion, we refer to the 
statute throughout this opinion as the IDEA. 
8
 In Pennsylvania, an impartial hearing officer presides over 
the due process hearing.  See 22 Pa. Code § 14.162(f). 
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1994).  In the normal case, exhausting the IDEA’s 
administrative process is required in order for the statute to 
“grant[] subject matter jurisdiction to the district court[].”  
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 (“[I]t is clear from the language of 
the Act that Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the 
administrative process before resorting to federal court.”); see 
also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).  After examining the 
administrative record and hearing additional evidence at the 
request of either party, the reviewing court is authorized to 
grant “such relief as [it] determines is appropriate” based on 
the preponderance of the evidence.  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).  These remedies include, inter alia, 
“attorneys’ fees, reimbursement for a private educational 
placement, and compensatory education.”  Chambers v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative process is 
also required in non-IDEA actions where the plaintiff seeks 
relief that can be obtained under the IDEA.  Congress 
provided an express “[r]ule of construction” in section 
1415(l), which states: 
 
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to 
restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and 
remedies available under the Constitution, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 
U.S.C. § 12101-12213], title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791-
794f], or other Federal laws protecting the 
rights of children with disabilities, except that 
before the filing of a civil action under such 
laws seeking relief that is also available under 
13 
 
this subchapter, the [IDEA administrative 
process] shall be exhausted to the same extent 
as would be required had the action been 
brought under this subchapter.   
 
20  U.S.C. § 1415(l).  “This provision bars plaintiffs from 
circumventing [the] IDEA’s exhaustion requirement by 
taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and 
repackaging them as claims under some other statute—e.g., 
section 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the 
ADA.”  Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 
281 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding plaintiffs properly exhausted 
ADA and Section 504 Act claims by participating in an IDEA 
due process hearing).  Thus, determining if the IDEA’s 
administrative process must be exhausted before bringing 
claims in federal court turns on whether the parties could 
have asserted the claims under the IDEA.  Intertwined with 
this inquiry is whether the claim could have been remedied by 
the IDEA’s administrative process.  This means that, absent 
the application of any exceptions, all of Appellants’ claims 
made pursuant to the IDEA require exhaustion, as do any 
claims asserted under Section 504 and the ADA, if they seek 
relief that is available under the IDEA.
9
  As set forth below, 
                                                 
9
 Appellants concede, and the record confirms, that they did 
not exhaust IDEA administrative remedies before filing the 
Complaint at issue here.  (Appellants’ Br. 6) (“[P]laintiffs 
have not exhausted their administrative remedies . . . .’”) 
(quoting App. 43a).)  Appellants do not assert they have filed 
a complaint pursuant to Section 1415(b), or participated in an 
impartial due process hearing under Section 1415(f).  Thus, 
they do not come before this Court as an “aggrieved” party.  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).   
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all of Appellants’ claims require exhaustion of the IDEA’s 
administrative process, and thus, the District Court did not err 
in dismissing them.  Appellants’ failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies forestalled the District Court from 
properly asserting subject matter jurisdiction over the federal 
claims.   
B. Applicability of the IDEA’s Exhaustion 
Requirement 
 At the outset, we reject Appellants’ argument that “this 
action is exempt from the requirement to exhaust 
administrative remedies pursuant to the IDEA” because “[t]he 
issues presented . . . are not educational issues[;] [r]ather they 
are issues of civil rights resulting from Defendants’ 
retaliatory conduct.”  (Appellants’ Br. 6, 10-13.)  To review, 
Count II asserts “retaliation/failure to provide [a] FAPE in 
violation of [the] IDEA[.]” (Compl. ¶¶ 73-82.)  Count III 
asserts “retaliation in violation of Section 504”.  (Id. at ¶¶ 83-
92.)  Last, Count IV asserts “retaliation in violation of the 
ADA”. (Id.  at ¶¶ 93- 101.)  We address each of these claims 
in turn.  
 
 Count II of the Complaint squarely falls within those 
claims subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i).  Indeed, Count II asserts a claim against the 
District under the stricture of the IDEA itself.  (Compl. ¶¶ 73-
82.)  Moreover, Appellants assert that as a result of the 
District’s failure to provide Ryan with a FAPE and to 
implement Ryan’s IEP, as is required under the IDEA, “Ryan 
has suffered and continues to suffer great harm to his level of 
educational achievement and personal well being.”  (Id. at ¶ 
81.)  It is plain that Count II falls within the ambit of § 
1415(i) and requires exhaustion: Appellants claim that the 
15 
 
IDEA has been violated, they allege educational harms, and 
the IDEA’s statutory scheme is able to provide an appropriate 
remedy. 
 It is less clear however, if exhaustion is required for 
Counts III & IV of the Complaint, which allege retaliation in 
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
ADA.  (Compl. ¶¶ 83-92, 93-101.)  We must decide, as a 
matter of first impression, whether a claim that a school 
district retaliated against a child and/or the child’s parents for 
enforcing the child’s rights under the IDEA could be brought 
under, and remedied by, the IDEA.  Appellants urge that it 
cannot.
10
  We disagree.  Appellants’ retaliation claims are 
related to the provision of FAPE under 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(b)(6) and, as such, must be exhausted.   
 The question at hand requires statutory interpretation 
in the first instance.  “Our goal when interpreting a statute is 
to effectuate Congress’s intent.  Because we presume that 
Congress’s intent is most clearly expressed in the text of the 
statute, we begin our analysis with an examination of the 
plain language of the relevant provision.”  Hagans v. Comm’r 
of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The IDEA affords parents 
of a disabled child the opportunity to present a complaint 
                                                 
10
 Under Appellants’ approach, parties would be exempt from 
exhaustion if they plead retaliation claims.  Such a holding 
would significantly lower the threshold to bring a claim in 
court.  This would be a radical departure from current 
practice. 
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“with respect to any matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child . 
. . .”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added).   
 
 Focusing on the claims asserted here, it is plain that 
Appellants’ retaliation claims palpably “relate” to the 
District’s provision of a FAPE to Ryan.  Specifically, 
Appellants contend that the District retaliated against Ms. 
Batchelor and Ryan “for their advocacy with respect to 
Ryan’s legally protected rights[.]”  (Compl. ¶ 89.)  They 
allege that the District, inter alia, bullied, intimidated, and 
further harassed Ms. Batchelor at meetings regarding Ryan’s 
progress (id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 89), failed to timely reimburse Ms. 
Batchelor for the cost of private tutors (id.), replaced a tutor 
with whom Ryan worked well, with another, presumably less 
effective tutor (id. at ¶ 89), refused to implement the terms of 
Ryan’s IEP (id. at ¶¶ 80, 89), placed Ryan in a class taught by 
Mr. Doyle, a teacher Ryan identified as being a bully (id. at 
¶¶ 46-49, 89), and refused to permit Ryan to participate in 
extracurricular activities during his senior year while enrolled 
in a charter school.  (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67, 89.)  Among other 
injuries, Appellants allege the District’s conduct deprived 
Ryan of a FAPE and caused “great harm to his level of 
educational achievement and personal well being.”  (Id. at  ¶¶ 
81, 92, 101.)  In accord with two of our sister circuits who 
require IDEA exhaustion of retaliation claims, we conclude 
that Appellants’ retaliation claims asserted under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA “relate unmistakably” to 
the provision of a FAPE to Ryan, and are thus subject to the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.  Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 
210 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that retaliation claims “relate 
unmistakably to the evaluation and educational placement of 
17 
 
[a student],  . . . and to the provision of a free appropriate 
education  . . . .”); see also M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
446 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[R]etaliation 
claims clearly relate to [the disabled student’s] evaluation and 
education, and, therefore, are subject to the [IDEA’s] 
exhaustion requirement.”).   
 
 In M.T.V. v. DeKalb County School District, the 
Eleventh Circuit found claims of retaliation to be “related” to 
the disabled student’s evaluation and education, so as to 
require IDEA exhaustion, where “the [s]chool [d]istrict 
harassed the student’s parents at IEP meetings, wrote them 
intimidating letters in response to their educational demands, 
and subjected the student to needless and intrusive testing.”  
446 F.3d at 1158-59.  Similarly, the First Circuit held in Rose 
v. Yeaw, that a claim of a school district’s retaliation “against 
[a student] in response to the [parents’] efforts to enforce his 
educational rights . . . relate[s] unmistakably to the evaluation 
and educational placement of [the student], . . . and to the 
provision of a free appropriate education . . . .”  214 F.3d at 
210. 
 
 We are satisfied that the plain language of the IDEA 
required exhaustion here, as there is a logical path to be 
drawn from the Appellants’ claims of retaliation to the 
District’s failure to provide, and Ms. Batchelor’s effort to 
obtain for, Ryan “a free appropriate public education”.  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); see also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“[T]he ordinary 
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose . . . .”). 
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 Besides the mandates of statutory interpretation, there 
is a strong policy reason requiring exhaustion of remedies 
available under the IDEA.  Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778.  
Exhaustion serves the purpose of developing the record for 
review on appeal, S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of 
Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the 
importance of fact-finding in IDEA cases), encouraging 
parents and the local school district to work together to 
formulate an IEP for a child’s education, Komninos, 13 F.3d 
at 778, and allowing the education agencies to apply their 
expertise and correct their own errors.  Cf. McKart v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (explaining the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and noting its 
application “to specific cases requires an understanding of 
[the statute’s] purpose[] and of the particular administrative 
scheme involved”); see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the 
Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was 
intended to channel disputes related to the education of 
disabled children into an administrative process that could 
apply administrators’ expertise in the area and promptly 
resolve grievances.”)  Indeed we have previously recognized 
that:  
 
[t]he advantages of awaiting completion of the 
administrative hearings are particularly weighty 
in Disabilities Education Act cases. That 
process offers an opportunity for state and local 
agencies to exercise discretion and expertise in 
fields in which they have substantial 
experience. These proceedings thus carry out 
congressional intent and provide a means to 
develop a complete factual record. Smith v. 
19 
 
Robinson, 468 U.S. [992, 1011 (1984)] 
(Congress made express efforts to place primary 
responsibility for fulfilling the needs of 
handicapped children on local and state 
education agencies). The administrative 
hearings generally will produce facts and 
opinions relevant to the very same issues 
presented to the court by plaintiffs. 
 
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 779.  These policy concerns weigh 
heavily in favor of requiring exhaustion, even where the 
complaint contains claims of retaliation.  Considering the 
parties’ failure to provide even the most basic of 
documentation in support of their positions, i.e., Ryan’s 504 
Plan and IEP, exhaustion will be particularly helpful in 
developing a factual record.  
 
 Given the plain language and structure of the IDEA, in 
addition to the purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement 
and the policy concerns supporting it, we now hold that 
retaliation claims related to the enforcement of rights under 
the IDEA must be exhausted before a court may assert subject 
matter jurisdiction.
11
   
                                                 
11
 It is also notable that special education hearing officers in 
Pennsylvania have addressed retaliation claims under the 
Rehabilitation Act in the past.  See Pennsylvania Special 
Education Hearing Officer Decision, Case No. 9629/08-09 
(Nov. 10, 2009), at 21, available at 
http://204.186.159.23/odr/HearingOfficerDecisions/9629-08-
09.pdf.  Moreover, a guidebook for parents issued by the 
Pennsylvania Office for Dispute Resolution notes that, in 
addition to IDEA claims, due process hearings regularly 
20 
 
C. Exceptions to the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement 
 Appellants argue that even if the Court finds that their 
claims fall within the scope of the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement, those claims are exempt because: (1) they seek 
only monetary damages, which are unavailable under the 
IDEA (Appellants’ Br. 13-15); (2) the implementation 
exception applies (id. at 15-19); and/or (3) the futility 
exception applies.  (Id. at 19-20.)  These arguments all fail. 
1. Monetary Damages not Available Under the IDEA 
 Appellants argue that their claims are exempt from the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because the remedies they 
seek are unavailable under the IDEA.  (Appellants’ Br. 13.)  
While such an exception does exist generally, Komninos, 13 
F.3d at 778, it is inapplicable in the instant case.  
 Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages, 
which, as they correctly point out, “are not available under 
the IDEA and cannot be awarded in the context of a Due 
Process hearing.”  (Appellant Br. 14) (citing Chambers, 587 
F.3d at 186).  This is not dispositive, however, for several 
reasons.  
 First, Appellants do not exclusively seek compensatory 
and punitive damages.  Indeed, despite Appellants’ assertion 
                                                                                                             
address claims made under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.  Understanding Special Education Due Process 
Hearings: A Guide For Parents, Pennsylvania Office for 
Dispute Resolution (2012), at 28, available at http://odr-
pa.org/2012-parent-guide/. 
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on appeal that “[t]he only remedy sought . . . is the payment 
of monetary damages” (Appellants’ Br. 14), the Complaint 
requests, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive 
damages, statutory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and 
“such other further relief as this court deems just and 
appropriate”.  (Compl. ¶¶ 82, 92, 101.)  Thus, it is untenable 
for Appellants to maintain that all of the remedies they seek 
are unavailable under the IDEA. 
 Second, in reviewing Appellants’ IDEA-related 
claims, the District Court is not constrained in the relief it is 
authorized to grant by the remedies sought in the Appellants’ 
Complaint.  On the contrary, the nature of Appellants’ claims 
and the governing law determine the relief, regardless of 
Appellants’ demands.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (“Every other 
final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its 
pleadings.”).  Applying this to § 1415(f), “the theory behind 
the grievance may activate the IDEA’s process, even if the 
plaintiff wants a form of relief that the IDEA does not 
supply.”  Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 
F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996).   
 In Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School 
District 68, plaintiff sued for monetary damages under the 
ADA, Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state tort law.  Id.  
Although plaintiff did not bring claims directly under the 
IDEA, the Seventh Circuit still required exhaustion of the 
IDEA’s administrative process.  Id. at 991-93.  The court 
emphasized that parents “cannot ignore remedies available 
under the IDEA and insist on those of their own devising; 
under the IDEA, educational professionals are supposed to 
have at least the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome 
the consequences of educational shortfalls.”  Id. at 992.  
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Under similar circumstances, the Second Circuit came to the 
same result.  See Polera, 288 F.3d at 478, 488 (requiring 
exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative process even though 
plaintiffs did not bring an IDEA claim and only sought 
monetary damages).  The Second and Seventh Circuits’ 
reasoning for requiring exhaustion of the IDEA’s 
administrative process applies with even more force in the 
instant case, as Appellants asserted claims directly under the 
IDEA. 
 Rather than being constrained by the remedies sought 
in the Appellants’ Complaint, the IDEA authorizes the 
District Court to grant Appellants “such relief as [it] 
determines is appropriate”.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  
See also A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
12  
 As we noted in D.F. v. 
Collingwood Borough Board of Education,  
                                                 
12
 Relief under Section 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) is “appropriate” if it 
furthers the purpose of the IDEA.  Sch. Comm. of Burlington 
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).  We have 
interpreted this provision “broad[ly]” to include attorneys’ 
fees, reimbursement for a private educational placement, and 
compensatory education.  Chambers, 587 F.3d at 185 
(collecting cases).  See e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 
557 U.S. 230, 246 (2009) (reimbursement for private school 
tuition); Collingswood, 694 F.3d at 499 (suggesting the 
school district could contract with a local provider to provide 
tutoring, counseling, or other support services); Ferren C., 
612 F.3d at 712 (creation of compensatory education fund); 
Shore Reg’l, 381 F.3d at 198 (payment for out-of-district 
tuition and related costs, including the student’s reasonable 
attorneys’ fees); Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health/Mental 
23 
 
[a]ppropriate remedies under the IDEA are 
determined on a case-by-case basis. “In each 
case, a court will evaluate the specific type of 
relief that is appropriate to ensure that a student 
is fully compensated for a school district’s past 
violations of his or her rights under the IDEA 
and develop an appropriate equitable award.”   
694 F.3d 488, 498-99 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ferren C. v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 720 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Thus, 
despite their plea to the contrary, the remedies that Appellants 
seek do not dictate the applicability of the IDEA to their 
claims. 
 Third, even though a monetary award is not available 
to Appellants during the IDEA administrative process as 
compensatory and punitive damages,
13
 such an award may 
nevertheless be granted as reimbursement for certain 
expenses incurred.  Indeed, “Congress meant to include 
                                                                                                             
Retardation v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(reimbursement to parent for the time she personally spent 
working with her disabled daughter, even though parent had 
no actual out-of-pocket expenses). 
13
 As per our holding in Chambers, Appellants’ request for 
compensatory damages on their IDEA claims fail, 
irrespective of exhaustion, as such damages are unavailable.  
587 F.3d at 186.  In Chambers, we stressed that “Congress 
intended to ensure that disabled children receive a FAPE 
under appropriate circumstances, not to create a mechanism 
for compensating disabled children and their families  . . . 
where a FAPE is not provided.”  Id.   
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retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy 
in a proper case.”  Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.  
For instance, if parents have paid for a disabled child’s 
education because the public schools were failing to provide a 
FAPE, the reimbursement of such expenses constitutes 
appropriate relief under the IDEA.  Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 
557 U.S. at 246; Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; 
Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1990).  
This reasoning applies with equal force with respect to 
reimbursement for inadequate tutoring services.  See D.F., 
694 F.3d at 498-99 (compensatory education can take the 
form of summer school and tutoring).  Accord Adams v. State 
of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (parents 
are entitled to reimbursement for appropriate private 
tutoring).  
 Appellants’ argument that their action “does not 
present any issue within the scope of § 1415(b)(6)” is further 
undermined by their claims that as a result of the District’s 
bad behavior, which included its failure to provide Ryan with 
a FAPE, “Ryan has suffered great harm to his educational 
achievement . . . .”  (Compl. ¶¶ 92, 101.)  It is clear that 
“[b]oth the genesis and the manifestations of the problem[s] 
are educational . . . .”  Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993.  The “IDEA 
offers comprehensive educational solutions . . .”  to directly 
address educational harms,
14
 id., and, in addition, provides 
                                                 
14
 Here, compensatory education is available even though 
Ryan has since graduated from high school.  Ferren C., 612 
F.3d at 717.  Under the IDEA, a school district’s obligation to 
provide a FAPE terminates when the child reaches the age of 
twenty-one.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Ferren C., 612 F.3d 
at 717.  In appropriate cases however, relief under the IDEA 
25 
 
reimbursement for certain financial losses that occur as a 
result of the educational harms.  See Ferren C., 612 F.3d at 
712 (compensatory education); Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental 
Health/Mental Retardation, 279 F.3d at 69 (financial 
reimbursement).  Thus, the District Court correctly concluded 
that despite being unable to award compensatory damages, if 
Appellants had prevailed at the due process hearing, the 
special education hearing officer would have been able to 
provide them with appropriate relief.
15
   
                                                                                                             
may be awarded beyond a student’s twenty-first birthday.  
Ferren C., 612 F.3d at 717 (awarding non-monetary award of 
compensatory education to twenty-four year old student).  
Here, Ryan’s age is unknown, and relief may still be available 
to him under the IDEA.  As is alleged in the Complaint itself, 
Ryan “continues to suffer great harm to his level of 
educational achievement,” and thus compensatory education 
may be an appropriate remedy.  (Compl. ¶¶ 81, 92, 101.) 
15
 This is not to say that Appellants will not be entitled to 
compensatory damages for their retaliation claims after they 
exhaust the IDEA administrative process.  As Appellees’ 
counsel recognized at oral argument, after the administrative 
hearing officer issues a decision, the IDEA authorizes “any 
party aggrieved by the findings and decision” to appeal to a 
federal district court.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).  In such an 
action, the court reviews the records of the administrative 
proceedings, hears additional evidence at the request of a 
party, and grants such relief as may be appropriate.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C); see also Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778.  At that 
point, so long as the aggrieved party has exhausted the 
IDEA’s administrative process, they may seek relief, such as 
compensatory damages, that is not otherwise available during 
26 
 
 Holding that Appellants must exhaust the IDEA’s 
administrative process before seeking judicial relief ensures 
that the purpose of the IDEA remains intact.  In response to a 
school district’s alleged bad behavior, the educational harms 
suffered by children with disabilities will be addressed first 
and foremost during the IDEA’s administrative process.  
Once these educational deficiencies have been addressed, 
victims may seek further remedy in court pursuant to 
statutory schemes allowing for compensatory and punitive 
damages, such as Section 504 and the ADA provide.   
2. Implementation Exception to the IDEA Exhaustion 
Requirement 
 Appellants also argue that their claims are exempt 
from the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because an 
implementation exception applies.  (Appellants’ Br. 15-19.)  
According to Appellants, the exception applies where the 
parties challenge only the implementation of a student’s IEP 
and not its adequacy or content.  (Id. at 16.)   
 
 There is no binding appellate precedent requiring this 
Court to recognize the implementation exception.  Instead, 
Appellants urge us to consider two cases from the Ninth and 
Second Circuits, as well as six district court cases from 
                                                                                                             
the administrative proceeding.  This means that, after 
exhaustion, Appellants may very well file a complaint 
containing virtually identical claims as asserted in the 
Complaint before us today.    
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Pennsylvania.  (Id. at 15-19; see also Appellant Reply 1-4.)  
These cases are inapposite.   
 
 The Ninth Circuit held in Porter v. Board of Trustees 
of Manhattan Beach Unified School District, 307 F.3d 1064, 
1071 (9th Cir. 2002), that since the parents exhausted the 
IDEA’s administrative process and obtained an order for a 
compensatory education program for their child, they were 
not required to again exhaust the IDEA’s administrative 
process or to comply with the state’s complaint resolution 
procedure
16
 before they could sue in federal court for failure 
                                                 
16
  As the Seventh Circuit explained: 
Distinct from the IDEA’s due process 
requirements, the U.S. Department of Education 
promulgated regulations pursuant to its general 
rulemaking authority requiring each recipient of 
federal funds, including funds provided through 
the IDEA, to put in place a complaint resolution 
procedure (“CRP”).  34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-
300.662 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 as 
authority for rules); Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. 
Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000).  The 
regulations require each state education agency 
to adopt written procedures for “[r]esolving any 
complaint” regarding the education of a child 
with a disability.  34 C.F.R. § 300.660(a). . . . 
The regulations do not, however, state that a 
parent must exhaust the CRP to enforce a due 
process decision in court. 
Porter, 307 F.3d at 1067; accord Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 281. 
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to implement the program.  Id.  The facts of Porter are 
materially different from the case at hand, as Appellants here 
have not invoked the IDEA’s administrative process in the 
past.  Moreover, although the parties entered into the binding 
Settlement Agreement, as a threshold matter that is not a final 
decision issued by a hearing officer that they can argue the 
District failed to implement.  See 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(1)(A) (“A 
decision made in a [due process hearing] . . . shall be final . . . 
.”); id. § 1415(i)(2) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision made under this subsection . . . shall have the right to 
bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented 
pursuant to this section . . . .”) (emphasis added).     
 In dicta, the Second Circuit has also acknowledged an 
implementation exception where the only issue presented is 
that “a school [] failed to implement services that were 
specified or otherwise clearly stated in an IEP”.  Polera, 288 
F.3d at 489.
17
  Ultimately, however, the Polera court declined 
                                                                                                             
 
17
 In recognizing this exception, the court relied on the 
following statement of Senator Paul Simon, a co-sponsor of 
two of the acts that formed the foundation of the IDEA: 
“It is important to note that there are certain 
situations in which it is not appropriate to 
require the exhaustion of [IDEA] administrative 
remedies before filing a civil law suit. These 
include complaints that . . . an agency has failed 
to provide services specified in the child’s 
individualized educational program.”  
Id. at 489 (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. § 10396-01 (1985)).   
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from applying the exception because implementation of the 
IEP was not the only issue presented.  Id. at 489.  To the 
contrary, the IEPs at issue “did not clearly state the 
obligations of the school”, and instead, their terms required 
the court’s interpretation.  Id.18  As an initial matter, looking 
at the record before us, it is impossible to adopt this exception 
as the parties have not appended a copy of Ryan’s IEP.  
Therefore, we do not know if Appellants’ claims 
“encompass[] both a failure to provide services and a 
significant underlying failure to specify what services were to 
be provided”.  Id.  However, even if Appellants had provided 
Ryan’s IEP, we would not have occasion to adopt this 
exception because the implementation of the IEP is not the 
sole issue in dispute.  Rather, unlike the plaintiffs in Polera, 
Appellants here make substantive claims under the IDEA for 
failure to provide a FAPE, in addition to claims for 
                                                 
18
 Rather, the IEPs in contention: 
include[d] long lists of abstract goals (for 
example, “will successfully accomplish the 
required language arts skills necessary to 
complete the grade 12 curriculum”) but [were] 
virtually silent as to what materials or services 
the school should provide. 
Id.  The court noted that, “[i]n order to identify those services 
(for example, to ascertain the content of a ‘curriculum’), we 
are left either to speculation or to reliance on extrinsic 
evidence . . . .” Id. 
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retaliation.  In accord, it would be inappropriate to apply an 
implementation exception in the case at bar.
19
   
3. Futility Exception to the IDEA Exhaustion 
Requirement 
 Lastly, Appellants attempt to save their claims from 
dismissal by arguing that the futility exception to the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement applies.  (Appellants’ Br. 19-20.)  
Their theory is that because “Ms. Batchelor had to sue the 
District not once but twice to enforce previous awards of 
compensatory education services, it is clear that a third resort 
to the IDEA’s administrate procedures to obtain further 
compensatory education would have been an exercise in 
futility.”  (Id.)   
 The District’s alleged past failure to implement Ryan’s 
Section 504 Plan and IEP is an insufficient basis to excuse the 
exhaustion requirement.  (Appellees’ Br. 22.)  That said, 
Appellants’ position does have traction in case law.  See 
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778; W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 
(3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Jersey City 
Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d at 799 (overruling Matula insofar as it 
held that money damages are available in a § 1983 action 
based on an IDEA violation).   
 In Matula, we employed the futility exception to 
excuse exhaustion, but notably, in that case, plaintiffs had 
                                                 
19
 Appellants also cite to six district court cases from 
Pennsylvania that excuse exhaustion under an implementation 
exception, but for the reasons provided in Section C. III, 
infra, they do not persuade us.  (Appellants’ Reply Br. 2.)  
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previously participated in hearings in front of an 
administrative law judge to resolve the student’s classification 
and placement, and, in addition, the factual record was fully 
developed.  67 F.3d at 496.  Under those circumstances, we 
determined that “an action seeking compensation for the 
alleged IDEA violations is [] ripe for judicial resolution.”  Id.  
Also, in Komninos, we recognized that the IDEA’s legislative 
history advises that exhaustion is not necessary when “an 
emergency situation exists (e.g., the failure to take immediate 
action will adversely affect a child’s mental or physical 
health).”  13 F.3d at 778 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 7 
(1985)).  
 District courts in this circuit have followed suit, 
implementing the futility exception where the plaintiff had 
previously exhausted administrative remedies, and where the 
factual record was sufficiently developed.  The district courts 
have also expanded this rule to situations where the plaintiff 
sought remedies unavailable under the IDEA, and where the 
court was not presented with educational issues to be 
resolved.  See Derrick F. v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 282, 295 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (further exhaustion would 
be futile where plaintiffs previously exhausted the 
administrative process); Adam C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 07-
CV-0532, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72903, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 23, 2008) (same); James S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 559 F. 
Supp. 2d 600, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (exhaustion would be 
futile where there had been “extensive administrative fact-
finding”); Vicky M. v. Northeastern Educ. Intermediate Unit 
19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437, 452-53 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (exhaustion 
would be futile where plaintiffs sought damages for physical 
abuse and where no other educational issues needed 
resolution). 
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 The instant case does not present any of the 
circumstances warranting the application of the futility 
exception: Appellants have not previously utilized the IDEA 
administrative process, the factual record is not developed 
and evidentiary issues are not resolved, the only remaining 
issue is not a measure of damages, and the IDEA 
administrative process is in fact able to provide a suitable 
remedy for the harms alleged.
20
  We therefore decline to 
excuse the exhaustion requirement under the futility 
exception here.
21
  
                                                 
20
 Instead, in the case at hand, the Complaint challenges, inter 
alia, the District’s provision of a FAPE to Ryan, the adequacy 
of tutoring and class instruction provided, and its denial of 
Ryan’s participation in extracurricular activities, (Compl. ¶¶ 
52-55, 66), all of which have “an educational source the 
administrative process may resolve.”   (App. 20a.)   
21
 In Rose v. Yeaw, the First Circuit rejected a similar non-
cooperation theory to the one asserted by the Appellants here.  
214 F.3d at 208-09.  In that case, a school district withdrew 
its request for a due process hearing on two occasions after 
the child’s IEP was amended to provide temporary placement.  
The First Circuit held that the school district’s withdrawal 
“did not render the administrative process futile” because the 
“IDEA specifically grants parents the right to unilaterally 
initiate a due process hearing.”  Id. at 212 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(1)).   
 District courts in the this Circuit have also declined to 
apply the futility exception in almost identical factual 
scenarios.  See e.g., Falzett v. Pocono Mountain School Dist., 
150 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2001); M.M. v. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Appellants have not exhausted the IDEA’s 
administrative process and fail to demonstrate that an 
exception applies.  Accordingly, we hold that the District 
Court was correct in dismissing the Complaint for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  For these reasons, we will affirm 
the District Court’s dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV of the 
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
                                                                                                             
Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., Civ- 06-1966, 2006 WL 
2561242, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  In M.M. v. 
Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., the district court rejected 
plaintiffs’ assertion that resorting to the IDEA administrative 
process would be futile because they previously participated 
in one resolution conference and one Section 504 conference, 
which resulted in “one empty promise after another.”  2006 
WL 2561242, at *7.  See also Kuszewski v. Chippewa Valley 
Schs., 51 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (growing 
animosity between the parties was not sufficient to find that 
the administrative process would be futile).     
